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As in all other common law jurisdictions, hearsay evi-dence—an out-of-court statement tendered for thetruth of its contents—is presumptively inadmissible in
Canada. In R. v. Khelawon,1 the Supreme Court of Canada
described the rationale for excluding hearsay evidence: 
While no single rationale underlies its historical
development, the central reason for the presumptive
exclusion of hearsay statements is the general inability
to test their reliability. Without the maker of the state-
ment in court, it may be impossible to inquire into that
person’s perception, memory, narration or sincerity. The
statement itself may not be accurately recorded. Mis-
takes, exaggerations or deliberate falsehoods may go
undetected and lead to unjust verdicts. Hence, the rule
against hearsay is intended to enhance the accuracy of
the court’s findings of fact, not impede its truth-seeking
function.2
This general prohibition is, as elsewhere, subject to excep-
tions in Canada (such as, for instance, res gestae, dying decla-
rations, etc.). However, through a series of judgments, the
Supreme Court of Canada has dramatically altered the tradi-
tional common law prohibition. The Supreme Court of Canada
has created what it has described as a “principled approach” to
the admissibility of hearsay evidence. This has opened the
door for the admissibility of such evidence in a broad context.
The Law Reform Commission of Ireland recently considered
the admissibility of hearsay evidence and summarized the
Canadian approach in the following manner:
The stance adopted by the Canadian courts to the
rule against hearsay and its exceptions involves a princi-
ple-based approach, i.e. the judging of cases with respect
to general principles such as “necessity” and “reliability”
rather than precise and pre-existing rules. The effect of
these decisions by the Supreme Court of Canada is that
hearsay evidence is admissible if the evidence meets two
criteria: that the evidence is necessary and reliable; and
that the probative value of the evidence is not out-
weighed by its prejudicial effect. Case law establishes
that the necessity criteria will be satisfied if the hearsay
evidence is reasonably necessary to prove a fact in issue,
the relevant direct evidence is not available, and that evi-
dence of the same quality cannot be obtained from
another source. The rationale for the new approach, as
noted by Lamer CJC in R v Smith, is that reliable evi-
dence ought not to be excluded simply because it cannot
be tested by cross-examination. However, he qualified
this by stating that the trial judge should have a residual
discretion to exclude the evidence where its probative
value is slight and it would thus be unfairly prejudicial
to the accused for it to be admitted.3
In this column, I am going to review how Canadian law
arrived at this point and illustrate by reference to two recent
decisions of the Ontario Court of Appeal that the scope of
hearsay is continuing to expand, but not without difficulties.
Let us start at the beginning.   
R. v. KHAN:
In R. v. Khan,4 the accused, a medical doctor, was charged
with sexually assaulting a three-and-one-half-year-old child. At
his trial, the Crown sought to introduce statements made by
the child (T.) to her mother (Mrs. O.), approximately fifteen
minutes after the alleged assault. The Crown argued that they
were admissible under the spontaneous-declaration exception
to the hearsay rule. The comments made by the child were as
follows:
Mrs. O.: So you were talking to Dr. Khan, were you? What did
he say? 
T.: He asked me if I wanted a candy. I said “Yes.” And do
you know what?
Mrs. O.: What? 
T.: He said, “Open your mouth.” And do you know
what? He put his birdie in my mouth, shook it and
peed in my mouth.5
The trial judge refused to admit the statements on the basis
that they were not contemporaneous with the event.6 The
Supreme Court of Canada agreed. It held that “applying the
traditional tests for spontaneous declarations, the trial judge
correctly rejected the mother’s statement.”7 However, the
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Supreme Court indicated that there was a “need for increased
flexibility in the interpretation of the hearsay rule to permit the
admission in evidence of statements made by children to oth-
ers about sexual abuse.”8 The Supreme Court held that such
evidence is admissible if it is “necessary” and “reliable:”
The first question should be whether reception of the
hearsay statement is necessary. Necessity for these pur-
poses must be interpreted as “reasonably necessary”.
The inadmissibility of the child’s evidence might be one
basis for a finding of necessity. But sound evidence based
on psychological assessments that testimony in court
might be traumatic for the child or harm the child might
also serve. There may be other examples of circum-
stances which could establish the requirement of neces-
sity.
The next question should be whether the evidence is
reliable. Many considerations such as timing,
demeanour, the personality of the child, the intelligence
and understanding of the child, and the absence of any
reason to expect fabrication in the statement may be rel-
evant on the issue of reliability. I would not wish to draw
up a strict list of considerations for reliability, nor to sug-
gest that certain categories of evidence (for example the
evidence of young children on sexual encounters)
should be always regarded as reliable. The matters rele-
vant to reliability will vary with the child and with the
circumstances, and are best left to the trial judge.9
Though Khan could be interpreted as only applying to
hearsay statements made by children in sexual assault cases,
the Supreme Court of Canada quickly dissociated itself from
such a limited interpretation. Two years after rendering its
decision in Khan, the Supreme Court of Canada extended the
principled approach set out in Khan to the admissibility of
statements made by an adult victim in a murder case. 
R. v. SMITH:
In R. v. Smith,10 the accused was charged with killing Ms.
Aritha King. At the accused’s trial, the Crown sought to intro-
duce a number of telephone calls made by the victim to her
mother. The Crown argued that these calls established that the
accused was with the victim immediately prior to her death.11
The Supreme Court of Canada held that the contents of the
deceased’s telephone calls to her mother were not admissible
under the “present intentions” or “state of mind” exceptions to
the prohibition against the admissibility of hearsay.12 However,
the Supreme Court indicated that Khan signaled “the triumph
of a principled analysis over a set of ossified judicially created
categories.”13 The Court concluded that the hearsay evidence
was “necessary” because the declarant was deceased. The
Court held that the necessity criteria will be established when
“direct evidence is not, for a variety of reasons, available.”14
The Court also held that in assessing reliability, the trial judge
should determine whether a “circumstantial guarantee of trust-
worthiness” exists.15
PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS:
R. v. Smith was followed a year later by R. v. B.(K.G.).16 In
B.(K.G.), the Supreme Court extended Khan to the introduc-
tion of prior consistent statements for the truth of their con-
tents. Significantly, in B.(K.G.), the declarants were available to
testify. The difficulty was that although they had provided
statements to the police incriminating the accused, they
recanted these statements at trial. The issue became whether
the Crown could introduce the witnesses’ police statements
not simply to contradict the reluctant witnesses but for the
truth of their contents. Relying on the common law rule which
prohibited the use of such statements for such a purpose, the
trial judge denied the Crown’s request and the accused was
acquitted. 17
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada held in B.(K.G.)
that “the time has come for the orthodox rule to be replaced by
a new rule recognizing the changed means and methods of
proof in modern society.”18 The Supreme Court concluded that
prior consistent statements could be admitted into evidence
for the truth of their contents if (1) the prior statement was
made under oath or solemn affirmation, (2) the entire state-
ment was video-recorded, and (3) the opposing party had the
opportunity to fully cross-examine the witness at trial respect-
ing the statement.19 The Court held that the necessity criterion
was met because “evidence of the same value” was not avail-
able from the recanting witness or other sources.20
B.(K.G.) was followed by R. v. U.(F.J.).21 Once again the
issue of admissibility of a prior consistent statement was con-
sidered by the Supreme Court. However, this case involved a
statement a complainant had provided to the police that had
not been taken under oath or video-recorded. 
In U.(F.J.), the complainant provided a statement to the
police in which she indicated that the accused, her father, was
having sex with her “‘almost every day.’”22 The interviewing
police officer had attempted to tape the interview, but the tape
recorder had malfunctioned. After interviewing the com-
plainant, the officer interviewed the accused. The accused
admitted to having sexual intercourse with his daughter
“‘many times.’”23 He described similar sexual acts as were
described by the complainant in her police statement. At trial,
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the complainant recanted the allegations of sexual abuse. The
issue became whether the complainant’s unrecorded statement
was admissible for the truth of its contents.
The Supreme Court concluded in U.(F.J.) that the com-
plainant’s statement was “substantively admissible” because
the “statements made by the accused and by his daughter con-
tained both a significant number of similarities in detail and
the strikingly similar assertion that the most recent sexual con-
tact between the two had been the previous evening.”24
The Supreme Court indicated in U.(F.J.) that its earlier deci-
sions were designed to ensure that the Canadian approach to
the admissibility “of hearsay as evidence would be sufficiently
flexible to adapt to new situations.”25
A FLEXIBLE APPROACH:
In R. v. Starr26 and R. v. Baldree,27 the Supreme Court of
Canada affirmed its suggestion in U.(F.J.) that the principled
approach should be sufficiently flexible to apply to a multitude
of hearsay issues. 28
In Starr, the Supreme Court of Canada held that if the pro-
posed hearsay evidence was admissible within a traditional
hearsay exception, the evidence “may still be inadmissible if it
is not sufficiently reliable and necessary. The traditional excep-
tion must therefore yield to comply with the principled
approach.”29 In Baldree, the Supreme Court of Canada indi-
cated that hearsay evidence is admissible if it falls under a tra-
ditional exception to the hearsay rule or if the principled
framework of necessity and reliability is established. 30
SPOUSAL INCOMPETENCY:
In R. v. Hawkins,31 the Supreme Court applied Khan to the
issue of spousal testimonial incompetence. The Court held
that the principled approach made the introduction of hearsay
necessary in that case because the witness, the accused’s
spouse, was incompetent to testify.32 Subsequently, however, in
R. v. Couture,33, the Supreme Court rejected that proposition
that the accused’s confession to his spouse was admissible on
the basis that it was necessary because of the spouse’s incom-
petency to testify against the accused. The Supreme Court held
that the confession was inadmissible because its admission
under the principled exception to the hearsay rule would, in
the circumstances of this case, undermine the spousal incom-
petency rule and its underlying rationales.34 The Court con-
cluded that the principled approach to the admissibility of
hearsay evidence should be applied in a manner which pre-
serves and reinforces the integrity of the traditional rules of
evidence.35
More recently, in Baldree, the Supreme Court considered the
application of its principled approach to “drug purchase
calls.”36 In the case, the accused was arrested and charged with
the offence of possessing marijuana and cocaine for the pur-
poses of trafficking. After the accused was arrested, an
unknown and unidentified person telephoned his cell phone
to arrange for a drug delivery. A police officer answered the call
and agreed to deliver the drugs at the price the accused nor-
mally charged.37 The Supreme Court concluded that none of
the traditional exceptions applied and the principled exception
was not established because of the lack of evidence concerning
reliability. The Supreme Court of Canada noted that though
the call received in this particular case was inadmissible, this
did not mean that all “drug purchase calls” were inadmissi-
ble.38
THE SUPREME COURT’S MOST RECENT CONSIDERATION
OF KHAN:
The Supreme Court of Canada’s most recent foray into the
50 Court Review - Volume 53 
reliability, required by the principled approach. The
exception can be modified as necessary to bring it into
compliance.
c. In “rare cases”, evidence falling within an existing
exception may be excluded because the indicia of
necessity and reliability are lacking in the particular
circumstances of the case.
d. If hearsay evidence does not fall under a hearsay
exception, it may still be admitted if indicia of relia-
bility and necessity are established on a voir dire.45
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS:
Two recent decisions from the Ontario Court of Appeal, R.
v. Zou46 and R. v. Khan,47 illustrate the ongoing difficulties
caused by the introduction of hearsay evidence and the
enlarged scope for its introduction. 
USE OF NARRATIVE EVIDENCE AS CORROBORATION:
In Zou, the accused was convicted of the offence of sexual
assault. The complainant (A.Y.) had sent an anonymous email
to the police in which she said that she had been sexually
assaulted by the accused. The Court of Appeal indicated that
A.Y.’s “email to the police was introduced into evidence during
her examination-in-chief. She read the document into the
record in its entirety and it was made an exhibit.” 48 Trial coun-
sel for the accused did not object and there was “no indication
by counsel or the trial judge of the purpose for which the email
was tendered or any limitation on its use.”49 The Ontario Court
of Appeal noted that the appeal raised “the often vexing ques-
tion of the evidentiary use that can be made of a complainant’s
prior consistent statement.”50
In convicting the accused, the trial judge referred to the
email: “I find A.Y.’s email, sent contemporaneously with the
events, to be corroboration of her evidence.”51
The accused appealed from conviction. The Ontario Court
of Appeal set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial. It
held that although the email “could be used to undermine the
defence position as to the motive for A.Y.’s false accusation,” it
could not be used to corroborate the complainant’s testimony.52
The Court of Appeal indicated that the trial judge’s “use of the
word ‘corroboration’ in the context of a prior consistent state-
ment by a witness is troubling. That word, as commonly under-
stood, refers to evidence from a source other than the witness
whose evidence is challenged which is capable of confirming
the veracity of the evidence of the challenged witness.”53
The Court of Appeal noted that the email “did not have
either characteristic required for evidence to be corroborative.
It was not from a source independent of A.Y. Nor could the
email confirm the veracity of A.Y.’s trial testimony unless the
Court Review - Volume 53 51
principled approach to the admission of hearsay is R. v. You-
varajah.39
In Youvarajah, the accused was charged with murder. The
co-accused (D.S.) pleaded guilty and signed an agreed state-
ment of facts (ASF) implicating the accused. D.S. was called as
a witness by the Crown at the accused’s trial, but DS testified
that he could not remember signing the ASF.40 The trial judge
rejected an application by the Crown to have the ASF entered
as evidence. However, the Ontario Court of Appeal set aside
the acquittal and ordered a new trial.41
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the acquittal
was restored. The Supreme Court noted that the ASF had not
been under oath nor videotaped. The Supreme Court also
noted that though the ASF was against D.S.’s interests, “the
underlying rationale for the admissibility of admissions as
against the party making them falls away when they are sought
to be used against a third party.”42 The Court ultimately deter-
mined that the ASF was not reliable:
The circumstances identified by the trial judge raise
significant concerns about the threshold reliability of the
portions of the ASF upon which the Crown sought to
rely at the appellant’s trial, all of which minimized D.S.’s
involvement in the murder. D.S. endorsed the ASF as
part of a plea bargain for second degree murder and a
sentence in youth court. In these circumstances, there
was motivation to shift responsibility to his co-accused.
D.S. was also assured that he would not have to make
any further statements to police and he testified at the
appellant’s trial that this was one of the reasons that he
had accepted the plea agreement. D.S. further testified
that he agreed to some facts in the ASF that he said he
did not or could not know and that he did not under-
stand everything that he read before agreeing to the
statement’s contents. Those portions of the ASF that
shifted responsibility for the murder to the appellant are
inherently unreliable.43
A SUMMARY:
In R. v. Mapara,44 the Court summarized its conclusions on
the admissibility of hearsay evidence through a principled
approach:
a. Hearsay evidence is presumptively inadmissible
unless it falls under an exception to the hearsay rule.
The traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule remain
presumptively in place.
b. A hearsay exception can be challenged to determine
whether it is supported by indicia of necessity and
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email was improperly used for the truth of its contents, or the
consistency between the email and A.Y.’s testimony was
improperly viewed as confirmatory of her trial testimony.”54
THE USE OF PRIOR STATEMENTS AS CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE:
In Khan, the accused, a police officer, was convicted of the
offence of sexual assault.55 The complainant was a prisoner the
accused was transporting to a police station. She alleged that
the accused sexually assaulted her while performing searches
of her in the back of a police cruiser. When the accused and the
complainant arrived at the police station, a female police offi-
cer (Constable Flint) told the complainant that she would be
searching her. The complainant became upset and said: “‘I’ve
been searched three fucking times. How many times am I
going to be searched?’”56 The trial judge ruled that this state-
ment was admissible as “‘a spontaneous utterance and as a
prior statement to assist the court with the ultimate credibility
of [the complainant].”57 The trial judge also indicated that the
statement was admissible under the principled approach to the
hearsay rule.58
The Ontario Court of Appeal held that though “the neces-
sity requirement under the principled approach does not
require that the witness be absent or unable to give evi-
dence,”59 necessity was not met in the case:
I am of the view that necessity was not met, and thus
the statement is not properly admitted under the princi-
pled approach. The complainant testified consistently
about the essential parts of the allegations. Whatever
lapses may have existed in her memory, they did not go
to the essential details of the allegation that she had been
previously searched numerous times. The record does
not establish that the complainant was unable or unwill-
ing to give a full account of events, or could not recall
significant details of the event. The necessity component
of the principled approach to hearsay is not satisfied.60
The Court of Appeal noted that as “pure narrative, prior
consistent statements carry no weight because they are ten-
dered simply to give the background to explain how the com-
plaint came to be before the court.”61 However, the Court of
Appeal also pointed out that if “the circumstances surrounding
the making of the prior consistent statement are such that the
statement assists in assessing the reliability and credibility of a
witness’s in-court testimony” this gives the “prior consistent
statements admitted as ‘narrative’ a more substantive use. . . .
This is referred to as narrative as circumstantial evidence.”62
The Ontario Court of Appeal concluded that the trial judge
had “properly placed the prior consistent statement on the
scale in assessing the credibility of the complainant’s in-court
testimony by considering the circumstances in which she made
her initial complaint to Constable Flint:”63
In my view, taking the reasons as a whole, the trial
judge used the prior consistent statement for the per-
missible purpose of evaluating the context in which the
initial complaint arose, in particular the fact and timing
of the complaint, and the spontaneous nature in which
it came out, in order to assist him in assessing the truth-
fulness of the complainant’s in-court testimony. While
some of the trial judge’s language was not ideal, his
phraseology must be put in context. In referring to the
“consistency of her complaint” . . .
The trial judge properly placed the prior consistent
statement on the scale in assessing the credibility of the
complainant’s in-court testimony by considering the cir-
cumstances in which she made her initial complaint to
Constable Flint. To this extent, the prior consistent
statement does add to the credibility of the com-
plainant’s in-court testimony and had probative value
beyond mere repetition. It was evidence of the sequence
and timing of events and the emotional state of the com-
plainant at the time of the utterance, and assisted the
trial judge in evaluating the credibility of the com-
plainant’s in-court testimony. The trial judge’s use of the
prior consistent statement was proper.64
On June 29, 2017, as this issue of Court Review was headed
to the printer, the Supreme Court of Canada issued its opinion
in R. v. Bradshaw,65 where it addressed this hearsay question:
“When can a trial judge rely on corroborative evidence to con-
clude that the threshold reliability of a hearsay statement is
established?”66
The Court’s answer:
[C]orroborative evidence may be used to assess
threshold reliability if it overcomes the specific hearsay
dangers presented by the statement. These dangers may
be overcome on the basis of corroborative evidence if it
shows, when considered as a whole and in the circum-
stances of the case, that the only likely explanation for
the hearsay statement is the declarant’s truthfulness
about, or the accuracy of, the material aspects of the
statement. The material aspects are those relied on by
the moving party for the truth of their contents.67
(continued on page 86)
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Across
1 Milan opera house, with “La”
6 The ___ Radio Hour
10 Crow call
13 Divvy up
14 Sandwichy cookie
15 “To a Mouse,” e.g.
16 Snacks for the dig-set-spike
crowd? (2 courts)
19 Stuntman Knievel
20 Cottonseed product
21 Disruptive noise
22 Got an ___ (saw a lot)
24 Barnyard scratcher
25 Actor Waterston
28 Part of DJIA
29 Arlo, to Woody
30 Plant used to make poi
31 1960s justice Fortas
34 Main thrusts
36 Merchandizing events
37 Gourd veggie for the shuttlecock
crowd? (2 courts)
40 Insurance investigator’s concern
41 American statesman Root
42 Bambi’s mother, for example
43 Shoe insert
44 “What did I tell you?”
45 Fink (on)
47 “Electric” fish
48 Hone of the Braves, briefly
49 “... ___ more than he could chew”
52 Hit the wrong button, say
53 Brooks who has won an Oscar,
Emmy, Grammy and Tony
SOME SERIOUS COURTING by Judge Victor Fleming
53 Degs. held by Romney and Bush
55 “Coal Miner’s Daughter” singer
Loretta
56 Clean tables
57 Put a question to
58 Crumpets go-with
59 Weigh-in abbr.
54 Collection of shops
56 Moldable mud for the hoops
crowd? (2 courts)
60 “___ Today”
61 Scorch on a grill
62 Yacht club site
63 Make use of snowy slopes
64 Answer with attitude
65 Rudder’s place
Down
1 Not squander
2 Garlic piece
3 See 46-Down
4 Dangled
5 Partook of
6 It merged with Exxon
7 Dentist’s kind of surgery
8 ___ Aviv
9 William of “Stalag 17” and
“Network”
10 Ring-tailed critter
11 ___ Annie (“Oklahoma!”
character)
12 Hitched
17 “I concede”
18 Five-dollar bill, in slang
23 Surround a with dense mist
24 Egypt’s Mubarak
25 Healthy lunch choice
26 Comeback to “Am not!”
27 Dayan or Arens
29 Ripped off
30 Fraternity letter
31 Taper off
32 Ballerina’s support
33 The “Ishtar” of cars
35 Superman’s makeup?
36 Diddly-___
38 Cohort of Curly and Larry
39 Unpleasantly penetrating
44 Accentuate
46 3-Down feline
48 Genesis vessel
49 Market pessimists
50 “... bear ___ witness against ...”
51 Natural ability
52 Morales of “The Burning Season”
Vic Fleming is a district judge in 
Little Rock, Arkansas. 
Answers are found on page 72.
(continued from page 52)
CONCLUSION
As can be seen, the principled approach to the admissibility
of hearsay evidence, as formulated by the Supreme Court of
Canada, allows for the introduction of hearsay evidence in a
potentially broad context. The recent decision of the Ontario
Court of Appeal in Khan, in which reference was made to nar-
rative evidence as circumstantial evidence, illustrates this
point.  However, the same Court’s decision in Zou illustrates
that despite the Supreme Court of Canada’s willingness to
allow for prior consistent statements to be admitted; great cau-
tion in their use is still warranted. 
Wayne Gorman is a judge of the Provincial
Court of Newfoundland and Labrador. His
blog (Keeping Up Is Hard to Do: A Trial
Judge’s Reading Blog) can be found on the web
page of the Canadian Association of Provincial
Court Judges. He also writes a regular col-
umn (Of Particular Interest to Provincial
Court Judges) for the Canadian Provincial
Judges’ Journal. Judge Gorman’s work has been widely pub-
lished. Comments or suggestions to Judge Gorman may be sent to 
wgorman@provincial.court.nl.ca. 
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